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Abstract
Seigniorage has often been cited as one of the most important and most readily
quantifiable arguments for a government not to give up its monopoly in base money.
The analysis in this paper shows that the measurement of seigniorage may lead to very
different results and that it eventually depends on the monetary environment in which
central banks issue and manage base money. For the less advanced countries in Central
and Eastern Europe, seigniorage has only been fiscally significant in high inflationary
economies and even then, the success in exploiting seigniorage has been limited.
Widespread currency substitution has contributed to the results. Governments in these
countries that are willing to stabilise prices but that lack the credibility to do so, may be
increasingly interested in euroisation. The more advanced EU accession countries have
received low revenues from having a national currency in recent years. Seigniorage has
arisen as a by-product of other central bank objectives, such as price and exchange rate
stability. This caused high sterilisation costs, and valuation gains of a central bank’s
asset portfolio have often been the main reason for positive results of seigniorage. In
their search for a viable monetary regime and in the face of further liberalisation of
capital markets, these countries might be advised to look at euroisation as a choice to
achieve price stability without exchange rate volatility.1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
he idea that each nation-state has its own national currency has become
increasingly challenged not only from countries forming currency unions, but
also from countries considering official substitution of the national currency by a
foreign currency. So-called official dollarisation has been vitally discussed in Latin
America. Some countries, such as Ecuador and El Salvador, have actually implemented
it. Likewise, official euroisation has recently been considered in Central and Eastern
Europe. The term dollarisation or euroisation describes the unilateral adoption of the
dollar or the euro through the means of a monetary agreement, which falls short of a full
monetary union (i.e. not implying institutions to jointly determine monetary policy).
While many have stressed the advantages of such a monetary arrangement compared to
a fixed but less credible peg, one of the main arguments against dollarisation or
euroisation is the loss of seigniorage, the revenues from the monopoly in base money. It
is argued that especially in countries with a weak enforcement of tax collection,
seigniorage accounts for a considerable share of budget revenues. But how much do
governments actually earn from having a national currency? The answer depends on the
concept applied for the measurement of seigniorage. And the decision on the concept
again depends on the environment, in which central banks issue and manage base
money.
Chapter 2 starts with a comparison of the different concepts of seigniorage. The various
processes of base money creation and management in their particular monetary
environment eventually determine, which concept should be used. It is also analysed
which process of base money creation may reflect a monetisation of budget deficits and
why the existence of assets backing base money may be important for a government in
an EU-accession country considering euroisation.
In Chapter 3, seigniorage is measured for two groups of countries. The first group
comprises the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and other less advanced Central
and East European countries. The case of the FRY is especially interesting because the
Republic of Montenegro, a part of the FRY, has already chosen to give up the dinar and
to introduce the D-mark in the first instance and now the euro as an official currency. A
weak institutional framework and difficulties in raising other sources of financing
budget deficits are common features and support the measurement of seigniorage by the
monetary concept.
The second group consists of more advanced accession countries to the European Union
(EU). The institutional framework of their central banks limits the possibilities to
exploit seigniorage for fiscal purposes. Additionally, the central banks of these countries
are faced with non-trivial costs and valuation changes when issuing and managing base
money. Therefore, a fiscal concept of measuring seigniorage is developed.




There is no single measure of seigniorage that is generally applicable; its
measurement eventually depends on the model and on the policy experiment being
considered (Drazen, 1985, p. 327).
razen’s statement implies that any measurement of seigniorage depends on a
suitable concept and that the choice of the concept depends on the monetary
environment in which central banks issue and manage base money. In the
following analysis, it will be argued that the monetary concept is most appropriate for
countries in which financial markets are underdeveloped and in which the government
eventually finances current budget deficits at the central bank. The opportunity cost
concept might be most appropriate, if base money is created by purchases of interest-
bearing assets or outstanding government bonds without any substantial costs or
valuation changes arising. And finally, it is shown that the fiscal concept is the concept
that is most widely applicable and that the two other concepts arise as special cases.
2.1 Monetary concept
In monetary concepts, seigniorage (s














where H is nominal base money (including currency in circulation and deposits of banks
at the central bank), P is the price level, D are absolute changes and q is the growth rate
of nominal balances. The concept has been widely used in the theoretical and empirical
literature, for example by Cagan (1956, pp. 77-86), Marty (1967, p. 72), Friedman
(1971, pp. 848-850) and Fischer (1982, pp. 300-305) and as will be argued later, it is
closest to the idea of a government financing current payments by taking loans directly
at the central bank or what is commonly understood as “using the printing press”.
2.2 Opportunity cost concept
In opportunity cost concepts, seigniorage (
o s ) is measured as the nominal interest rate
i multiplied by real base money, h:
h i s
o ￿ =
This measure takes into account the opportunity costs borne by the government and has
also been extensively analysed in the literature; see for example Marty (1978, pp. 437-
452) and Phelps (1971, pp. 174-178).
The opportunity costs will arise if the government has to finance its expenditure through
the issuance of interest-bearing bonds instead of issuing noninterest-bearing currency.
By using a nominal interest rate instead of a real interest rate, it is assumed that money
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holders increase nominal balances in face of inflation to keep the real value of base
money constant.
1
Most estimates of seigniorage for developed economies use an opportunity cost concept
with a short-term interest rate, e.g. a money market rate.
2 This actually differs from the
original idea of the opportunity cost concept which would suggest an interest rate on
government bonds. The underlying idea for the choice of the interest rate in these
estimates is rather based on the opportunity costs of revenues, which would be foregone
if the central bank were not able to issue base money. Choosing a domestic money
market rate is appropriate if base money is issued by refinancing operations between the
central bank and commercial banks in the domestic money market. Similarly, if base
money is created by interventions in the foreign exchange market, the relevant interest
rate will be the rate of return on foreign assets. In contrast to the monetary concept
which calculates revenues from newly printed balances, the opportunity cost concept
takes into account the fact that the central bank receives returns from a stock of assets
accumulated by the outstanding quantity of base money.
And another caveat may be kept in mind when relying on the original idea of the
opportunity cost concept. Issuing bonds is not the only way of eventually balancing the
budget, when seigniorage is not available. Lost fiscal revenues from seigniorage could
also lead to a reduction in government expenditures, an increase in foreign aid or even
an increase in illegal sources of revenues. Opportunity costs would then have to be
assessed on a wider economic perspective, including lost output due to lower
government expenditures and consequently less tax revenues.
3
2.3 Fiscal concept
The fiscal concept of seigniorage (
f s ) focuses on the net revenues the fiscal authorities
obtain from central banking operations, which are not only linked to the creation of base
money but also to its management and which are distributed to the fiscal authorities.
Klein and Neumann (1990) or Lange (1995, pp. 26-29) have called it fiscal seigniorage;
it has also been occasionally called “total seigniorage”.
k v c b a i s
cb f - + + + ￿ = ) (
The term  ) (
cb b a i + ￿  describes the revenue of the portfolio of assets held at the central
bank, which comprises assets outside the government sector,  a, and government bonds
held at the central bank, 
cb b .
4
                                                
1 The opportunity cost concept then precisely gives  h i ￿ + ) 1 /( p .
2 See for example Hochreiter, et al. (1996) and Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2000).
3 However, a reduction in government expenditures, which may have been more harmful than beneficial
to the economy, such as subsidising unproductive state companies or a temporary increase in revenues
received from foreign aid and conditional on a quick implementation of stabilisation policies, may not
bear this form of opportunity cost at all. And finally, the lack of inflationary financing at the central bank
may lead to higher output, because lower and less volatile inflation provides a better economic
environment for investments and may even prevent economic activities to be driven into the informal
sector.
4 In order to simplify the analysis, the interest rate does not differ between assets.FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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The issuance of base money in order to finance current expenditures – “money printing”
- is shown by  c . It reflects a claim to the government, which is held against base
money issued for the fiscal purpose of financing government consumption.
Costs,  k , arise with the issuance and management of base money. Valuation changes,
v, occur in the asset portfolio accumulated by previous issues of base money and are
included in the measurement because they arise with having a monopoly in base money.
The measurement can also include interest revenues on retained earnings, which have
been neglected here for simplicity, although this case can be relevant in practice.
5
Instead of distributing all revenues to the fiscal authorities, central banks can also
withhold part of their earnings and accumulate reserves over time. In this case the
central bank receives an additional flow of revenues from the assets backing retained
earnings.
Assuming that no valuation changes and costs arise and that interest rates are equal is a
precondition for transforming the fiscal concept into its two special cases, the monetary
concept and the opportunity cost concept. As shown in Figure 1 the monetary concept
will arise as a special case of the fiscal concept, if the issuance of base money takes
place by direct lending for current expenditures. The fiscal concept will be generally
equal to the opportunity cost concept, if base money is either issued by purchasing
outstanding government bonds or by acquiring interest bearing-assets outside the
government sector. In Annex II, the link between the concepts is shown in detail by
deriving them from budget identities.








k v c b i a i
cb - + + ￿ + ￿
2.4 Advantages of the fiscal concept
The monetary concept and the opportunity cost concept are only applicable in certain
situations of base money creation, in which costs and valuation changes can be
disregarded, whereas the fiscal concept should be used, if they matter.
                                                
5 Revaluation reserves can be quite excessive; see Gros, and Schobert (1999). Hochreiter et al. (1996, p.
632) have argued to include revaluation reserves, reserve provisions, deferred income and other kinds of
retained earnings into the measurement of seigniorage, although statutes of several central banks should
prevent excessive capital accumulation, e.g. in Germany the legal reserve is restricted to 5% of banknotes
in circulation and other reserves to the Bundesbank’s capital.SEIGNIORAGE
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The inclusion of the costs on the one hand is important, because having a monopoly in
base money is a source of both revenues and expenditures. Generally it is assumed that
the costs of producing paper money are very low and thus net revenues do not differ
significantly from gross revenues. However, this assumption neglects other potentially
significant sources of costs of the issuance and management of base money. Whereas
costs arising from other responsibilities of the central bank such as banking supervision
can be neglected, costs arising from monetary policies and the management of base
money need to be considered.
Introducing on the other hand valuation changes into the measurement of seigniorage is
necessary if large valuation changes arise and eventually can be distributed to the fiscal
authorities. One could argue that valuation changes cancel out over time and that any
valuation gains should be held as reserves. Revaluation reserves are a buffer against the
risk of adverse market movements and therefore valuation gains should not be
distributed to the fiscal authorities. However, the measurement of seigniorage might
only matter for a certain period of time in which large valuation changes arise. If the
risk of changes in market movements disappears at the end of this period, reserves are
not needed any more and valuation gains can be distributed to the fiscal authorities. This
is the case of EU accession countries, which hold foreign exchange reserves in euro and
which will give up their own currencies, when they join the European Monetary Union
(EMU) or even earlier, when they consider the unilateral adoption of the euro.
The fiscal concept offers another advantage. Compared to the monetary and opportunity
cost concept, it measures seigniorage from the asset side rather than from the liability
side of the central bank. Therefore, it directly looks at the sources of revenues by
looking at the items backing base money. These items either represent assets outside the
government sector (a) such as foreign exchange reserves or inside the government
sector ( c b
cb+ ) such as all forms of claims to the government. As shown in Annex II,
only the former can be safely regarded as net assets whereas the latter most likely
represents consolidated government indebtedness. In a fiat money system the items
backing base money are generally not important, because the main objective of the
central bank, price stability, is pursued without considering the backing of base money.
But if a government considers official euroisation or dollarisation, this issue becomes
technically relevant, because the government will need to convert its stock of cash in
domestic currency into cash in foreign currency. If there are sufficient marketable
assets, i.e. foreign reserves, these can readily be sold in exchange for domestic cash.
However, if base money is backed by net government indebtedness, which has financed
past budget deficits, the government would need to take up a loan to finance the
conversion of cash in domestic currency into cash in foreign currency. The government
would eventually swap its non-interest-bearing liabilities (its outstanding cash in
domestic currency) into an interest-bearing loan. In Annex II, it is shown, that under
given assumptions a government bears the same costs in both cases.
In this respect, the situation of EU accession countries is a special case, because losses
of seigniorage would only arise temporarily, if they euroised. To understand this point it
is useful to summarise the special situation of EU accession countries. A country that
euroises but has the opportunity to join the European Monetary Union at a later stage
including its participation in seigniorage-sharing, will only suffer from lost seigniorage
until it joins the monetary union. As has already been pointed out by Rostowski (2000,FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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pp. 20-21), the countries would not suffer from any losses on the stock of assets, which
formerly were held against base money and which they now have spent to convert base
money into euro. According to the statute of the European System of Central Banks, the
“monetary income” of a national central bank of a member country will not remain in
the hands of the national central bank. The monetary income is the return from those
assets the central bank holds to back base money. Monetary income of the central banks
of all member states shall be pooled and then shall be allocated to the central banks in
proportion to their paid-up shares in the capital of the European Central Bank (Art.
32.5). The regulation of seigniorage-sharing implies that the link between the size of
base money issued by a national central bank (or the assets held against it) and its
seigniorage received is broken. Whereas the contribution of a central bank to total
monetary income of the Eurosystem will depend on the stock of its base money, the
fiscal revenues of the government will depend on the capital share, i.e. equally on the
country's share in gross domestic product (GDP) and population.
Thus, a euroised EU accession country only loses the return on its asset portfolio until it
becomes a full member of EMU. As soon as it enters EMU it will be entitled to
participate in the sharing of seigniorage although it will not be able to contribute any
monetary income of its own at the beginning, because it has already sold assets held
against base money when it became euroised. Therefore, it will not contribute to the
common pool of monetary income, but other member countries that have acquired their
assets in exchange for euro will do so instead.
So what does the backing of base money imply for governments of EU accession
countries considering euroisation? Central banks, which have backed their base money
with marketable assets sell them and purchase cash in euro. They temporarily lose the
return on the assets until they join EMU and participate in the sharing of seigniorage.
They do not lose the stock of assets backing base money, because they joined the
monetary union without base money and therefore will not contribute to the common
pool of seigniorage, but nevertheless participate in the sharing of seigniorage. The saved
contribution equals the interest income on the assets, which have been used to purchase
cash in foreign currency, and over a sufficiently long period of time, the net present
value of the stream of interest income will equal the stock of assets. Central banks,
which have no marketable assets, have to carry the debt-service cost of the loan in
addition to losses on seigniorage. But assuming that the cost of servicing the loan equals
the income, which they do not contribute to the common pool of seigniorage, the costs
of foregone seigniorage and debt-service costs are limited for the period prior to their
joining the monetary union. Thus, in both cases losses are only borne temporarily until
the country joins the monetary union. This result, is derived in more detail in Annex II.7
CHAPTER 3
THE MEASUREMENT OF SEIGNIORAGE
eigniorage is now measured by different concepts over the most recent years in
order to assess whether temporary losses of seigniorage would have been fiscally
significant. First, the monetary concept is used to calculate seigniorage in Central
and East European countries. Then a fiscal concept is applied to a group of more
advanced EU accession countries and compared to the results received by using an
opportunity cost concept.
3.1 Applying the monetary concept to Central and Eastern Europe
Measuring seigniorage by the monetary concept is the most common method and it will
be applied for a sample of countries, which consists of all EU accession countries in
Central and Eastern Europe
6 and Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Russia and Ukraine (thereby covering most countries in the region) from 1995-99.
7
To treat the results as  fiscal revenues, which have been received on average from
seigniorage, would be misleading. As argued above this will only be the case under
certain conditions of base money creation, which may only have existed in some less
advanced economies with central banks lacking any financial independence. As shown
in table A2 in Annex I, the statutes of all central banks formally either limit or prohibit
fiscal financing. However, many of these statutes have been heavily amended in the
second half of the 1990s, and even despite being stipulated by law, the fiscal financing
restrictions were not always binding or were disguised in other transactions with the
central bank.
Take for example Montenegro, the smaller of the two remaining republics of
Yugoslavia, which used the D-mark and then the euro as the only official currency since
November 2000, and thereby can be considered a “euroised” economy. In order to
assess the loss of seigniorage as a consequence of the Montenegrin decision, the
Montenegrin share of seigniorage of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is measured by
assuming a 5% share of total monetary seigniorage in Yugoslavia (which roughly
represents the Montenegrin share of output and population in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia).
8 Formally, the Federal Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia only
allows 10% of the budget to be financed by the central bank. But during the 1990s,
when war and sanctions contributed to serious fiscal distress, base money had neither
been created by receiving marketable, interest-bearing assets at the central bank nor had
there existed any access to capital markets to finance budget deficits alternatively with
interest-bearing bonds. The creation of base money can be regarded as directly
financing fiscal or quasi-fiscal deficits or as an accommodation of the extra demand for
reserves from state banks, which lent to the public sector.
                                                
6 Including Turkey, which is regarded as European according to international economic standards.
7 The time period until 1999 allows a comparison with Montenegro, which used the new Yugoslav dinar
from 1994 to 1999, then switched to a parallel system with the D-mark and officially introduced the D-
mark/euro as the only currency in 2000.
8 Seigniorage was not officially shared with the Republic of Montenegro, although some unofficial
agreements on its sharing may have existed between the two republics.
SFRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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Ukraine represents another example in support of using the monetary concept as an
approximation for fiscal revenues. The government’s current financing needs were
sometimes not served by its ability to borrow, because domestic and foreign investors’
interest in government bills or bonds remained weak, partly because of the uncertain
economic environment, but also because of the government’s reluctance to let the yields
rise to levels that would have been attractive to market participants. As a result, the
central bank purchased a significant amount of treasury bills in the primary market and
so it directly financed the budget deficit of the current period.
9
Box 1. Limiting the effects of public sector deficits on base money – The case of Turkey
Monetising the deficit by borrowing directly at the central bank increases base money, whereas
borrowing from the rest of the banking system does not automatically have this effect. It will
only do so, if the central bank accommodates extra demand for credit from banks by supplying
them with additional reserves (See Barth and Hemphill, 2000, pp. 72-73). Otherwise, crowding
out of credit to the private sector usually takes place through higher interest rates and will affect
the profitability of banks, which can cause problems in the banking systems. Most obviously the
effects of public sector deficits on base money will stop, if the government gives up its own
currency and unilaterally introduces a foreign currency. But even less strict institutional changes
can have similar effects.
The case of Turkey may give an example along these lines. In the Turkish banking system, state
banks have provided subsidised credits to certain borrowers, belonging to preferential groups of
the government. As the operations of the central bank became more transparent (the structure of
base money creation was limited by a ceiling on domestic assets and had to fulfil a floor on
foreign assets), the state banks needed to acquire additional funds from the bank deposit and
repo market. Up until around 1994-95, the cost of these quasi-fiscal activities could be borne by
these banks and covered by their own profits. Their large market share both for deposits and
commercial lending helped to limit the spread between their cost of borrowing and the
subsidised rate of their lending. But under the impetus of financial liberalisation since about
1995, the banking system became more competitive and the spread started to rise eroding their
profitability and causing large deficits. The state banks did not need to react to losses of their
profitability, however, because deficits were filled by an accumulation of claims on the
government (the so-called unpaid duty losses), the yield of which was de facto set so as to cover
any loss accumulated during each year. Attracting new funds at higher interest rates further
increased their losses as their lending policy remained unchanged. Nevertheless, any shortfall of
revenues over expenses was covered by the treasury and the banks did not need to face a clear
budget constraint.
10 At the end of 2000, duty losses amounted to about 12% of output and yearly
increases in duty losses averaged at 3.5% of output during 1995-99, thereby exceeding any
revenues collected from seigniorage. According to the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey,
these sums were calculated as net claims on special duty accounts of deposit money banks.
Institutional changes, like more transparent central bank operations combined with a more
competitive banking system, made the situation unsustainable and contributed to the Turkish
banking and currency crises in 2001. Now these costs are eventually borne by the government
and public debt has been increased substantially. If Turkey had been euroised, it would have
avoided a currency crisis, but not necessarily a banking crisis. Giving up the monopoly in base
money stops the effects of financing public sector deficits on base money, but without
additional reforms, public sector deficits will cause problems elsewhere.
                                                
9 IMF Ukraine Country Report (1999, p. 57). In the Annex this process is formally described in detail.
10 IMF country report (2000, pp. 12-14).SEIGNIORAGE
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Refinancing the credit expansion of the domestic banking system can also imply a fiscal
exploitation of the monopoly in base money under certain conditions and therefore
contribute to monetary seigniorage. It will stop if either the refinancing operations of the
central bank become more market-oriented, as shown in the example of Turkey as
described in Box 1, or if the government eventually decides to give up its own currency.
When the banking system then continues to finance fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits,
however, the government is likely to ultimately bear the costs. Therefore, a government
considering unilateral euroisation as a rapid approach to break the fiscal link between
the central bank and the banking system should consider the same rapid approach to
banking and fiscal reform as well. These reforms are needed in any event and
postponing them should not be a reason to hold on to a national currency.
In Table 1, the results of measuring seigniorage by the monetary concept are presented
as averages of yearly data. Annual data are given in Table A1 in Annex I. For each
country, the ratio of the change in base money to nominal GDP is calculated in the first
column. In the second column, seigniorage is calculated as a share of total fiscal
revenues.
For countries with relatively low inflation rates, seigniorage is generally not an
important source of revenues, but it is even relatively unimportant in high inflationary
economies, in constrast to Fischer’s results, in which seigniorage accounted for well
above 2% of output and 10% of total fiscal revenues.
11 In this sample, 7 out of 12
economies, which on average suffered from double-digit inflation during the period,
have had seigniorage above 2% of GDP and only 3 of them above 10% of total fiscal
revenues.
The figures in parenthesis show the results for monetary seigniorage calculated by
changes in currency in circulation, one component of base money. The difference
between the two results are mainly due to changes in deposits that banks hold at the
central bank.
12 When measuring seigniorage, it is usually assumed that deposits of
banks at the central bank consist of non-interest bearing reserves and thereby are similar
to currency in circulation. However, when considering the unilateral adoption of a
foreign currency, losses from revenues on currency in circulation are the most relevant
figure to look at, whereas losses on the other components of base money mainly depend
on financial regulations. For example, a government does not necessarily lose revenues
from non-interest bearing deposits held by banks at a monetary authority, as long as it
enforces reserve requirements on banks and as long as it does not remunerate these
deposits. In contrast, as countries move closer to the accession of the monetary union, in
which reserves are remunerated, they may decide to pay interest on reserves and thereby
lose this part of seigniorage even without unilaterally introducing the euro.
According to this measurement of seigniorage, only 4 out of 12 high inflationary
economies receive seigniorage above 2% of output and only Albania receives
seigniorage above 10% of fiscal revenues. Most striking are the results for Turkey,
which earns almost three times as much seigniorage, when calculated with base money
                                                
11 In Fischer (1984, pp. 302-303), the results were generally based on a longer time period.
12 Precisely, the difference in base money (reserve money in the definition of the IMF) and currency in
circulation are deposits of banks at the central bank and other deposits excluding deposits of the central
government. However, the size of other deposits is generally not significant.FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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as when calculated with currency in circulation. The difference is mainly due to the
financial repression by the government on banks, which are asked to hold deposits at the
central bank. In contrast, the low figure for seigniorage, measured with currency in
circulation, better reflects the flight from the domestic currency, which has considerably
reduced this source of revenue.








GDP in % p.a.
Albania 3.6 (3.5) 17.0 (16.6) 14.8 2.1
Belarus 4.2 (2.2) 9.8 (5.3) 155.8 3.1
Bulgaria 5.1 (3.1) 12.7 (8.4) 180.1 -1.6
Croatia 1.0 (0.6) 2.3 (1.3) 4.5 3.9
Czech Rep. 3.4 (1.2) 6.3 (2.5) 7.1 1.6
Estonia 2.4 (1.2) 5.6 (2.9) 12.8 4.5
Hungary 1.5 (1.2) 3.3 (2.8) 17.6 3.3
Latvia 1.6 (1.2) 5.0 (3.8) 9.9 3.2
Lithuania 0.9 (1.0) 2.7 (2.9) 12.0 3.5
Macedonia 0.8 (0.4) 2.5 (1.3) 2.2 1.4
Montenegro 1.4 (1.1) 2.3 (1.8) 72.0 6.6
Poland 1.6 (1.3) 3.7 (3.0) 14.4 5.8
Romania 2.3 (1.5) 7.3 (4.9) 66.3 -0.7
Russia 2.0 (1.9) 9.4 (9.8) 57.0 -1.7
Slovak Rep. 1.9 (1.1) 4.1 (2.5) 7.8 5.0
Slovenia 0.9 (0.5) 2.0 (1.0) 8.6 4.0
Turkey 3.3 (1.2) 14.1 (5.7) 78.0 4.0
Ukraine 2.4 (2.1) 6.3 (5.6) 54.1 -5.6
Inflation: December to December change of CPI index (RPI for Albania and Croatia). Total fiscal
revenues: Revenues of the consolidated budget and monetary seigniorage (for Montenegro: revenues of
the central government and social funds). Reserve money: Currency in circulation, deposits of banks, and
deposits of other residents apart from the central government, with the monetary authorities.
Sources: MONET, International Monetary Fund (IMF) country reports, International Financial Statistics
(IFS) and central banks.
High inflation rates have usually an ambiguous effect on seigniorage. On the one hand,
they increase seigniorage because of the higher nominal value of transactions conducted
with domestic currency, but on the other hand higher inflation also shifts the economy
into economising cash holdings or into other means of payments and thereby decreases
the demand for domestic currency. Montenegrin seigniorage gives an example of thisSEIGNIORAGE
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case. With 1.4% of GDP and about 2.3% of total fiscal revenues, it strikes out as being
extremely low compared to inflation. In Figures 2 and 3, some further evidence on this
is presented by cash-to-GDP ratios and by the structure of broad money.


































Sources: IMF country reports, central banks and own calculations.
Figure 3. Structure of broad money (average for 1995-99)
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A high ratio of cash to GDP supports revenues collected from seigniorage. In developed
economies, the ratio ranges between 5 and 10%. Therefore, less advanced economies
with less developed financial systems should tend to have higher ratios when assuming
no flight out of their own currency. But in Figure 2, only Albania strikes out with a cash
ratio of about 17%. Economies with rather low ratios with regard to their level of
financial development are Romania, Belarus, Turkey, Montenegro and the former
republics of Yugoslavia (Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia). Especially Montenegro and
the former republics of Yugoslavia share the same unstable monetary past until the early
1990s, in which high inflation and a loss of confidence in the banking system were key
features of the financial system. Though this monetary environment persisted in
Montenegro, but changed in the former republics of Yugoslavia, it may have not
changed the habits of economising on cash in domestic currency and using foreign
currency instead. In Turkey an extremely high inflationary environment for decades has
probably contributed to a serious erosion of using the domestic currency.
In Figure 3 the structure of broad money is used to show which other means of
payments than domestic currency may have been used in these countries. The ratio of
foreign currency deposits to broad money (including cash and deposits in domestic
currency and deposits in foreign currency) usually serves as an indicator of currency
substitution. Although cash in foreign currency is probably the most important
substitute for domestic currency, data on it are missing because they are extremely hard
to detect.
13  By using this indicator in order to assess the extent to which international
currencies have substituted cash in domestic currency, it is thereby implied that deposits
and cash in foreign currency are held for similar reasons. This is not necessarily the
case, but the interpretation seem to fit well for some countries, for example Croatia and
Turkey, and to a lesser extent to Montenegro, because here deposits in foreign currency
are mainly held by legal entities, whereas private households practically hold foreign
currency only as cash.
The evidence does not give a clear picture on which factors have driven the different
results on seigniorage in these economies. Overall, seigniorage measured by the
monetary concept seems to be only important in some high-inflationary economies in
Central and Eastern Europe.
3.2  Seigniorage in advanced EU accession countries
3.2.1 Monetary environment and the process of base money creation
How much do the more advanced Central European countries like the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia fiscally gain from keeping their national
currency while they aim to achieve important preconditions for an early EU accession,
i.e. stable exchange rates, a high degree of capital market liberalisation and central
banking activities sheltered from government financing?
For these more advanced EU accession countries with open capital markets, a fiscal
concept is most suitable for measuring seigniorage. A fiscal concept explicitly accounts
for costs and valuation changes arising from the monopoly in base money and both are
                                                
13 The most recent studies for Croatia are found in Feige et al. (2000). The significance of the national
currency as a means of payment would be lowered additionally if cash in foreign currency were included.SEIGNIORAGE
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important in the special environment in which these central banks issue and manage
base money.
Before specifying the suitable concept, the monetary environment and its impact on the
process of base money creation and management need to be analysed. Some of the more
advanced EU accession countries targeted their exchange rates in the period under
consideration and at the same time they struggled with high capital inflows putting
upward pressure on their pegged exchange rates. This made interventions in the foreign
exchange market necessary, which in turn created excessive liquidity in the banking
system. Thus, in order to drain part of the liquidity, these central banks were forced to
use various forms of costly sterilisation instruments.
This special monetary environment is thoroughly described by Nuti (2000) for Poland.
The National Bank of Poland was caught in an inescapable dilemma by net capital
inflows and the rapid accumulation of foreign reserves. Either it had to allow the
domestic monetary expansion brought about by reserve acquisition, possibly at the cost
of inflation, or it had to incur hefty costs of sterilisation, and the Bank opted for both.
14
The IMF notes that the Bank of Slovenia often found itself pursuing conflicting
objectives: tight monetary conditions aimed at achieving lower inflation tended to lead
to an appreciation of the currency, while exchange rate interventions aimed at
preserving competitiveness tended to slow disinflation. To keep the balance between
objectives, the central bank had to engage in second-round interventions and maintain a
strong and continuous presence on the money market.
15 The central bank’s policy
dilemma can be similarly described for the Czech Republic and Hungary. Aiming at
price  and exchange rate targets is the crucial ingredient of the dilemma, but just
pursuing one of the two objectives did not seem to be a viable option for these
countries. Interestingly, even in Slovenia, which officially pursued a managed floating
exchange rate regime, or the Czech Republic, which moved from an officially pegged
exchange rate systems to a managed floating system, the exchange rate objective of
central banks in these small and open economies has remained non-trivial so far.
Accordingly, the process of base money creation should be reflected in the central
banks’ balance sheets and eventually in their profit and loss account.
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In Figure 4 on the previous page, the process is shown in a stylised balance sheet. Its
structure of assets and liabilities should reflect the creation and management of base
money just described. Foreign assets are accumulated on the asset side and cover not
only base money but also sterilisation instruments, which are sold to drain part of the
liquidity. The return on foreign assets measured by the generally lower foreign interest
rate, i foreign, and the stock of foreign assets is compared to interest expenses on
sterilisation instruments measured by a generally higher domestic interest rate, i domestic,
and the stock of sterilisation instruments. Assuming that the return on foreign assets is
lower than the expenses on sterilisation instruments, a country does not necessarily
receive net revenues on its monopoly in base money. However, the calculation has not
considered valuation changes of foreign assets yet. Because the balance sheet is highly
leveraged, exchange rate depreciation causes revaluation gains measured by the
depreciation rate,  d, and the sum of base money and sterilisation instruments. If
valuation gains outweigh losses on interest income, the central bank will still make
gains on its monopoly in base money.
Analysing whether this process can be traced on the balance sheets of the five central
banks is more difficult in practice. Base money on the liability side is easily identified,
but the underlying process of base money creation is blurred. Developments of balance
sheet items not only include activities related to the issuance and management of base
money but also to other activities conducted by the central bank. Therefore, it is not
useful to look at the entire balance sheet in order to identify seigniorage. It is more
advisable to artificially split central banking operations into activities arising from the
“issue department” and from the “banking department” and only to focus on the first
group of activities.
16
A closer look at the balance sheets of the five central banks in Graphs A1 to A5 in the
Annex I confirms that the process of base money creation and management cannot be
easily traced by the overall asset and liability structure of the central bank. Apart from
the Bank of Estonia, base money generally comprises less than 50% of total liabilities.
Not surprisingly, the Bank of Estonia is special, because it is basically a monetary
authority carrying out the strict rules of the currency board regime. Sterilisation
instruments are relatively significant compared to base money at the other central banks.
And the share of base money and sterilisation instruments is fully covered by assets
denominated in foreign currency over most periods. This gives a first indication of the
process underlying base money creation and the choice of the concept.
The issuance and management of the national currency is just one activity among
several conducted by the central banks, which include acting as a fiscal agent or
supporting a weak banking system. For example, the Czech National Bank was involved
in restructuring the banking system by taking over assets and liabilities or guaranteeing
liabilities of various banks. The National Bank of Hungary has issued foreign exchange
bonds as part of public debt management. Therefore the structure of the assets  and
liabilities side of the National Bank of Hungary has been dominated by foreign
                                                                                                                                              
15 See IMF Country Report (2000, p. 39).
16 The definitions go back to the Bank of England Act (1844), which divided the Bank into two
departments – the Issue Department, which dealt with the Bank’s note-issuing function, and the Banking
Department, which was intended and proposed to behave as an ordinary commercial bank; see Goodhart
(1988, p. 8).SEIGNIORAGE
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exchange. In contrast, while the asset sides of both the National Bank of Poland and the
Czech National Bank have also been dominated by foreign exchange, the liability sides
are mostly denominated in domestic currency. Thus, their balance sheet structure better
reflects the results of interventions in foreign exchange markets arising from managing
base money.
So what has driven base money creation at these central banks? Transactions at the
balance sheets of the central banks do not give evidence of a significant share of base
money created by fiscally related transactions. In line with the central bank laws (see
Table A1 in Annex I), claims to the budget have been low or zero at all central banks.
As already mentioned, the large share of foreign currency credit to the central
government at the National Bank of Hungary is linked to its debt management in which
the bank also used to issue international bonds on behalf of the government. Now, the
state’s foreign borrowing programmes and bond issuances have been transferred to the
Treasury and Debt Management Agency as one further step towards a clearer and more
transparent separation of monetary and fiscal policies. The amount of government
securities held at the central bank is only important at the National Bank of Poland, but
here they consist of old government loans, which are now converted into securities. Any
movements are mainly the result of ongoing repayments by the government or changes
in debt-servicing terms.
Some caveats may be kept in mind. Securities and shares held by the Czech National
Bank reflect its involvement in the restructuring of the banking system including cash
advances to weak banks. The National Bank of Poland has also lent to troubled banks
and additionally has extended loans to banks in order to refinance central government
investment projects. These balance sheet items at the Czech National Bank and the
Bank of Poland are about 10 to 15% of base money. To the extent that losses on these
assets will be incurred, the central bank may indirectly finance the government as it
prevents higher government expenditures, which would otherwise probably be directly
charged to the budget.
Having these caveats in mind, only limited financing of the government or opportunities
to indirectly do so can be identified at the central banks in recent years.
Other balance sheet items, which are most closely connected with the issuance of base
money are claims to banks and, especially in small open economies with pegged
exchange rates, foreign exchange assets. Claims to banks can be regarded as the major
counterpart to base money created by monetary policy-related transactions. Foreign
assets are generally accumulated by interventions, and reflect the creation of base
money by autonomous transactions. They dominate the asset side of the five central
banks as shown in Graphs A1-A5 in Annex I.
In Graphs A6 to A10, the development of base money, currency in circulation, foreign
assets and claims to banks are shown for the five central banks. At all central banks,
foreign assets have not only dominated the balance sheet but have also closely risen
with base money. Foreign assets have even increased much faster than base money at
the National Bank of Poland and to a lesser extent at the National Bank of Hungary,
whereas claims to banks, the domestic source of base money creation, have decreased.
The evolution of the balance sheet items supports the view that the creation of baseFRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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money was mainly the result of interventions.
17 However, at the Bank of Slovenia the
picture is less clear-cut. Though foreign assets dominate the balance sheet and rise
closely with base money, the Bank of Slovenia has actively provided base money to
domestic banks by domestic operations. Claims to banks have risen sharply over some
periods in contrast to their evolution at the other central banks. However, the Bank of
Slovenia has differed from the situation at other central banks. It used the sale of tolar
bills as conventional sterilisation instruments and the sale of foreign exchange bills to
sterilise capital inflows that have already been realised, but have not been monetised.
Thus, foreign exchange bills are primarily used to pursue the central bank’s exchange
rate objective but eventually prevent the sale of more costly sterilisation instruments in
domestic currency. The Bank of Slovenia is successful in pursuing this policy, because
banks have a strong motive to purchase foreign currency bills, since such instruments
can serve as collateral for loans at the central bank and can be temporarily sold back to
the central bank through repos. In fact, foreign exchange bills had reached about 13% of
total assets in commercial banks’ balance sheets in 1997-98, which highlights the
importance of these instruments for exchange rate interventions, but also for some
monetary policy-related transactions at the Bank of Slovenia.
 18
Summing up, the balance sheet structure and the evolution of base money, foreign
assets and claims to banks support the view described above. The central banks, apart
from Estonia and to a lesser extent the Bank of Slovenia, have issued and managed base
money by being placed in a policy dilemma reflected by high interventions and costly
sterilisations.
3.2.2 The measurement of seigniorage
Because of the special process of base money creation and management causing
significant costs and valuation changes, a fiscal concept will be applied. Excess liquidity
is issued by interventions in the foreign exchange market and has been sterilised by
costly instruments. Consequently, considering all revenues and expenditures connected
with the issuance and management of base money, these costs will be included in a
suitable concept because they belong to the overall management of base money.
19 The
proposed measure of fiscal seigniorage is:
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The first term, foreign assets (FA) multiplied by the respective interest rates i x,
comprises interest revenues earned on the existing stock of base money (H). The sum of
this part of the portfolio of foreign assets equals the sum of base money (cash in
circulation and current accounts of financial institutions). The currency structure of the
portfolio of foreign assets is not known and therefore it is assumed that it is equal to the
structure of the currency basket of the exchange rate peg for Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic, to the euro for Estonia and to the structure of currencies, as stated by
                                                
17 In 1998, the National Bank of Hungary quite openly states that base money is predominantly created by
interventions in the foreign exchange market (Annual Report 1998, p. 126) .
18 IMF country report (2000).
19 Many thanks to Daniel Gros for pointing out this issue.SEIGNIORAGE
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the Bank of Slovenia in its comments to its balance sheet at each end of the year, for
Slovenia. The investment of foreign assets is supposed to be mainly short term, so
interest rates ix are chosen to be treasury bill rates for the US and three-month interbank
rates for all other currencies. Thus, revenues earned on the stock of base money depend
on the structure of foreign assets FAx in each currency x and the respective interest rates
ix in the anchor countries.
In the second term the costs of sterilisation are shown as the spread between the interest
rate paid on sterilisation instruments isi and the interest rate on foreign assets. Weights
qx of foreign interest rates are again chosen by the structure of the foreign assets as
described above. If the interest rate on sterilisation instruments is not published, it is
equal to the domestic base rate or another comparable short-term domestic rate. It is
assumed that the domestic interest rate must be at least equal to the lowest domestic
market rate, because this rate must be at least offered on marketable sterilisation
instruments.
The last term measures valuation changes on the total portfolio of foreign assets of the
“issue department”. It comprises foreign assets as counterparts to the stock of base
money ( H FA = ) and foreign assets as counterparts to sterilisation instruments (SI). A
positive dis the actual depreciation rate of the currency against its anchor currencies, a
negative  dis accordingly the actual appreciation rate. Because the central banks have
large open foreign exchange positions in their “issue department”, valuation gains are
received by the rising value of net foreign assets when the domestic currency
depreciates against its anchor currencies. In this concept it is assumed that all valuation
gains and losses, whether realised or not, are distributed to the fiscal authorities.
20 So
different accounting policies of the central banks are ignored in order to make the
results comparable, as already discussed in Chapter 2. If foreign assets are denominated
in euro, the central banks will not need the revaluation reserves any more at the time
they join the euro area. And foreign assets denominated in other currencies have
become less important as the central bank started to target the euro instead of other
anchor currencies. They can be sold as the countries join EMU, because the Eurosystem
is already regarded as having excessive foreign exchange reserves. Accordingly,
revaluation reserves eventually are distributed to the fiscal authorities.
More details to the data and methods used for the measurement of seigniorage are given
in Table A8 in Annex I.
In case the central bank remunerates required reserves, as for example in Hungary and
Estonia, interest rate expenditures on required reserves i rrRR are deducted. Thus,
interest revenues on the stock of base money are calculated net of interest expenses due
to minimum reserves.
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20 At the National Bank of Poland and at the Bank of Slovenia, revaluation gains that are not yet realised
are held as reserves. The National Bank of Hungary changed accounting practices in 1999 and only
distributes realised revaluation gains as well, whereas the Czech National Bank distributed all revaluation
gains, which adds a volatile feature to their stated profits.FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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The proposed fiscal concept is compared with the opportunity cost concept used in other
studies of seigniorage,
21 where i is chosen as a domestic refinancing rate or other
comparable short-term interest rate.
H i S ￿ =
For comparison, seigniorage will be calculated as if the countries had already joined
EMU and as if EMU had already existed over the period. The opportunity cost concept
is called “implied EMU” and differs from the first opportunity concept in two aspects:
Interest rates are either Fibor/Euribor-rates and base money does not include minimum
reserves, because they will be remunerated at market rates under EMU.
All calculations are based on monthly data from the financial statements of the
respective central banks.
22
In Table 2, the results are presented as an average for the period 1995-2000. Annual
results are given in Tables A3-A7 in Annex I.
Table 2. Seigniorage by concepts (average 1995-2000)
As % of GDP Czech
Republic
Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia
Opportunity cost concept 1.49 0.69 1.99 1.86 0.62
Implied EMU 0.38 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.10
Fiscal concept 0.19 0.38 0.89 0.02 0.47
of which:
+ Net interest revenues 0.43 0.38 0.00 0.36 0.18
- Sterilisation costs 0.60 0.00 0.54 0.59 0.08
+ Valuation changes 0.36 0.00 1.43 0.25 0.38
Source: Financial statements of central banks; differences due to rounding.
Average seigniorage calculated by the fiscal concept is far lower than seigniorage
calculated by the more commonly used opportunity cost concept. Looking at the
components of seigniorage measured by the fiscal concept reveals the differences.
Net interest revenues are lower than one would expect by the opportunity cost concept.
This result can be attributed to lower returns earned on foreign assets compared to the
returns implied by the opportunity cost concept. Due to high inflation gaps with respect
to their anchor countries, domestic nominal interest rates have been relatively high as
well over most of the periods. However these domestic interest rates are not applicable
to the fiscal concept but only to the opportunity cost concept.
                                                
21 Most recently in Hochreiter and Rovelli (1999).
22 Only averages of yearly data on minimum reserves and on sterilization instruments have been available
from the Czech National Bank.SEIGNIORAGE
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Additionally, sterilisation costs have averaged at about 0.5-0.6% of GDP in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. Sterilisation costs have not only been influenced by the
volume of outstanding sterilisation instruments, but also by the level of interest rates
relative to interest rates in anchor countries. Net interest revenues have not compensated
for the losses resulting from the use of costly sterilisation instruments. Only, and not
surprisingly, again, Estonia has practically zero costs on sterilisation and on valuation
changes. The fiscal concept only deviates from the opportunity cost concept because
domestic interest rates in Estonia still bear a risk premium over foreign interest rates.
And due to its differentiated sterilisation in tolar and foreign exchange bills, the Bank of
Slovenia succeeded in limiting sterilisation costs,
23 but total seigniorage remains fiscally
unimportant.
The case of Hungary shows that remunerating required reserves might be a hidden
sterilisation cost because the net interest revenues have been nil on average. Generally
higher reserve requirements offset the costs of sterilisation because part of the liquidity
is blocked by minimum reserve accounts bearing below-market or no interest rates. So
not reducing required reserves or even increasing them will save costly sterilisation
operations if they are not remunerated. But this of course is in sharp contrast to more
market-oriented central banking policies, which these countries should pursue on their
way to EU membership.
Central banks do not explain the use of high minimum reserve requirements as less
expensive sterilisation instruments, but they openly admit the link between minimum
reserve requirements and sterilisation costs.
24 The Czech National Bank has actually
increased reserve requirements over some periods, though its true motivation for it
remains unclear.
25 However reserve requirements have been adjusted downwards and
will approach the ratio of the European Monetary Union (EMU) as countries will
accede further to EU.
26 So, even if central banks have postponed more progressive
reductions of reserve requirements in previous years, they will have to adjust to lower
levels soon and thus will be unable to use reserve requirements as inexpensive
sterilisation instruments.
Valuation gains on average are only important in the case of Hungary, but at all central
banks apart from the Bank of Estonia they have heavily influenced the overall positive
results.
                                                
23 Sterilisation costs include costs on tolar bills and on foreign currency bills, although the costs on
foreign currency bills have even been negative over some periods, because the interest rate on these
instruments have been lower than the interest rates on foreign assets held against them. Sterilisation
instruments as shown in Table A5 in Annex I only include tolar bills.
24 For example, as stated in the annual report of the Czech National Bank, the decrease of minimum
reserves by 2% points at the end of July 1998 has increased liquidity in the banking system, which would
have caused higher sterilisation costs if the decrease of domestic interest rates due to lower inflation had
not decreased capital inflows and therefore the need for sterilisation instruments.
25 Reserve requirements on primary deposits increased from 8.5% in August 1995 to 11.5% in August
1996 and decreased slowly to 9.5% in May 1997, 7.5% in July 1998, 5% in January 1999 and finally 2%
in October 1999. Whether this was motivated by weaknesses of the banking business or by the attempt to
reduce sterilisation costs remains unclear.
26 Reserve requirements in the Eurosystem are 2% on all deposits and are remunerated at market interest
rates.FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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The concept “implied EMU” measures seigniorage as if these countries would have
been full members of the Monetary Union and if the Monetary Union would have
existed over the period observed. Interest rates would have been considerably lower and
minimum reserves would have not generated seigniorage anymore. Only small
differences arise between the countries, which are mainly due to different behaviours in
cash holdings. The calculation has only concentrated on what these countries would
have generated as seigniorage in EMU, but not on what they would have received. This
in turn depends on their capital share at the ECB and can differ substantially in cases
where the share of base money differs from the share in GDP and population in the
Eurosystem. Thus, for countries, in which cash holdings are relatively low, seigniorage




he loss of seigniorage is often argued to be a major disadvantage of official
dollarisation or euroisation because seigniorage is assumed to be an important
source of fiscal revenues. This can mean that it comprises a high share of fiscal
revenues or GDP. Additionally, it can mean that seigniorage is an emergency source of
revenue which can be activated in case other sources of fiscal revenues do not cover the
financial needs of the government.
The first interpretation can be analysed by quantifying actual seigniorage after selecting
a suitable fiscal concept. No concept is generally applicable for measuring seigniorage
and the choice of the concept eventually depends on the specific environment in which
base money is created. In this respect, the fiscal concept is the most general concept for
measuring the revenues from the monopoly in base money, which can be distributed to
the budget. The monetary and the opportunity cost concepts arise as special cases.
In the second interpretation, it is implicitly assumed that the central bank serves the
government without being sufficiently independent to withstand its financial needs. In
such a weak institutional framework, borrowing at the central bank to cover current
expenditures takes place in different forms, such as direct lending from the central bank
or purchasing government bonds that could not be sold on the capital markets. The
central bank serves the fiscal needs of the government, because the government is
eventually not able or willing to finance deficits with marketable bonds as an
alternative. In this monetary environment the fiscal impact of the monopoly in base
money can be measured by the monetary concept.
The monetary concept is applicable for Yugoslavia in the 1990s or to some other less
advanced economies in Central and Eastern Europe, but for comparison it has been
measured for a large group of countries in the region. If at all, monetary seigniorage has
only been important in high inflationary countries. Permanent shifts to other means of
payments, i.e. currency substitution or economising of cash holdings, have influenced
the relatively low success in collecting seigniorage.
For more advanced Central and Eastern European countries, which aim at an early EU
accession and therefore try to achieve a high degree of central bank independence and
stable prices, seigniorage is not an actively exploited source of fiscal revenue. It has
rather arisen as a by-product of the operations, which are used to achieve other central
bank objectives, namely price and exchange rate targets. For these countries a fiscal
concept for measuring seigniorage has been developed, which takes into account the
specific monetary environment in which base money is created and costly managed.
Seigniorage has been relatively low and its overall positive result has often depended on
valuation gains. Central banks of these countries have actually struggled to manage their
national currencies in an environment of high and volatile capital flows unless they
explicitly targeted only one objective, for example only exchange rate stability as in
case of Estonia. The monopoly in base money has eventually not only been a source of
revenues but also a source of expenses for central banks in these countries, because part
of the excess liquidity created by foreign exchange interventions was drained by the sale
of costly sterilisation instruments. Using less costly sterilisation instruments, such as
TFRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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postponing reductions of high minimum reserve requirements will be limited for the
countries as they move closer to EU accession.
Overall, the fiscal argument against euroisation in more advanced EU accession
countries is quite weak, because these countries have not earned much from their
monopoly in base money. On the contrary, low and volatile seigniorage mainly resulting
from a depreciating exchange rate may become increasingly disturbing for a central
bank, because costs of sterilisation and potential valuation losses from adverse exchange
rate movements can eventually outweigh interest revenues on its asset portfolio. The
government may then have an additional reason to reconsider the choice of its monetary
regime either towards more truly floating regimes or towards euroisation, which offers a
way to achieve price stability without any exchange rate volatility in liberalised capital
markets.23
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ANNEX I. STATISTICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS






Inflation rate Change in
(real GDP in %)
Albania
1995 5.1 22.9 6 8.9
1996 2.7 14.9 17.4 9.1
1997 8.6 38.9 42.1 -7
1998 -0.2 -1.4 8.7 -8
1999 1.7 9.5 0 7.3
Av 95-99 3.6 17.0 14.8 2.1
Belarus
1995 4.2 12.0 244 -10.4
1996 2.9 7.2 39 2.8
1997 3.7 8.0 63 11.4
1998 6.1 12.8 182 8.4
1999 4.1 8.8 251 3.4
Av 95-99 4.2 9.8 155.8 3.1
Bulgaria
1994
1995 5.2 12.8 32.7 2.9
1996 6.7 18.0 311.3 -10.1
1997 11.3 26.6 547.8 -6.9
1998 1.0 2.6 1.6 3.5
1999 1.5 3.6 7.0 2.4
Av 95-99 5.1 12.7 180.1 -1.6
Croatia
1995 2.1 4.4 4.6 6.8
1996 1.9 4.1 3.7 6.0
1997 1.3 2.9 5.0 6.5
1998 -0.3 -0.6 5.3 2.5
1999 0.2 0.5 3.8 -2.1
Av 95-99 1.0 2.3 4.5 3.9FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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Czech Republic
1995 10.1 16.1 7.8 6.4
1996 0.1 0.3 8.6 4.8
1997 0.0 0.0 9.9 -1.03
1998 4.6 10.0 6.9 -2.20
1999 2.0 4.9 2.5 -0.20
Av 95-99 3.4 6.3 7.1 1.6
Estonia
1994
1995 2.1 4.9 28.9 4.28
1996 2.1 5.2 14.8 3.90
1997 3.6 8.4 12.5 10.59
1998 0.7 1.8 4.2 4.09
1999 3.2 7.7 3.8 -0.50
Av 95-99 2.4 5.6 12.8 4.5
Hungary
1995 1.9 4.4 28.3 1.5
1996 -0.9 -2.2 19.8 1.3
1997 2.3 5.2 18.4 4.6
1998 1.7 4.0 10.3 4.9
1999 2.3 5.3 11.0 4.2
Av 95-99 1.5 3.3 17.6 3.3
Latvia
1994
1995 0.2 0.6 23.2 -0.8
1996 2.2 7.4 13.2 3.3
1997 3.2 9.8 7.0 8.6
1998 0.8 2.6 2.8 3.9
1999 1.4 4.8 3.2 1.1
Av 95-99 1.6 5.0 9.9 3.2
Lithuania
1994
1995 0.2 0.7 35.8 4.8
1996 2.6 8.0 13.0 4.7
1997 2.5 7.1 8.4 7.3
1998 -0.4 -1.2 2.4 5.2SEIGNIORAGE
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1999 -0.3 -1.0 0.3 -4.2
Av 95-99 0.9 2.7 12.0 3.5
Macedonia
1995 1.1 4.7 9.0 -1.1
1996 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 1.2
1997 1.0 3.0 2.6 1.4
1998 0.3 0.9 -2.4 2.9
1999 1.6 4.5 2.4 2.7
Av 95-99 0.8 2.5 2.2 1.4
Montenegro
1995 1.5 2.7 104.1 14.1
1996 2.1 3.5 47.2 27.7
1997 2.1 2.9 18.1 6.6
1998 0.6 1.0 44.8 -1.5
1999 0.8 1.4 146.0 -13.8
Av 95-99 1.4 2.3 72.0 6.6
Poland
1995 2.9 6.4 22.0 7.1
1996 1.5 3.4 18.7 6.0
1997 2.5 5.6 13.2 6.9
1998 1.4 3.3 8.5 4.9
1999 -0.1 -0.3 9.8 4.0
Av 95-99 1.6 3.7 14.4 5.8
Romania
1995 2.0 6.5 27.8 7.1
1996 2.9 9.8 56.9 3.9
1997 1.1 3.9 151.4 -6.1
1998 2.4 7.8 40.6 -5.4
1999 2.9 8.6 54.8 -3.2
Av 95-99 2.3 7.3 66.3 -0.7
Russia
1995 2.3 9.9 131.3 -4.1
1996 2.1 9.8 21.8 -3.4
1997 2.1 9.8 11.0 0.9
1998 0.1 7.6 84.4 -4.9
1999 3.4 9.9 36.5 3.2FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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Av 95-99 2.0 9.4 57.0 -1.7
Slovak Republic
1994
1995 2.7 5.6 7.2 6.7
1996 3.0 6.2 5.4 6.2
1997 2.2 4.8 6.5 6.2
1998 -0.7 -1.8 5.6 4.1
1999 2.2 5.5 14.2 2.0
Av 95-99 1.9 4.1 7.8 5.0
Slovenia
1995 1.3 2.7 8.7 4.1
1996 0.7 1.4 8.8 3.5
1997 0.9 2.0 9.4 4.6
1998 0.8 1.9 7.5 3.9
1999 1.0 2.2 8.8 3.8
Av 95-99 0.9 2.0 8.6 4.0
Turkey
1995 2.9 13.8 78.9 6.7
1996 3.1 14.6 76.5 7.0
1997 3.4 14.3 99.2 7.9
1998 2.9 11.9 68.4 3.2
1999 4.1 15.8 67.0 -5.0
Av 95-99 3.3 14.1 78.0 4.0
Ukraine
1995 3.7 9.6 181.7 -12.2
1996 1.6 4.2 39.7 -10
1997 2.3 6.1 10.1 -3
1998 1.5 4.2 20 -1.7
1999 2.7 7.5 19.2 -1.2
Av 95-99 2.4 6.3 54.1 -5.6
Notes: Inflation: December to December change of CPI index (RPI for Albania and Croatia). Fiscal
revenues: taxes, social contributions, customs duties (excluded in Montenegro).
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Table A2. Lending to the government dealt with in statutes of central banks in 2001 (unless otherwise stated)
Country Limit Maturity Legal Act
Albania 5% of the annual average of the Government of the Republic of Albania’s
ordinary revenue for the three preceding financial years and exceptional
temporary waiver not exceeding 8% of it.
Exceptions are possible if government debt arises due to membership in
international organisations.
Purchases of government bonds in the secondary market are possible. Under
certain conditions they do not add up to the overall limit on government debt.
Max. 6 months Arts. 30, 31, 32 of the Law on the
 of Albania
Belarus N/A
Bulgaria No credit to the state or to state institutions Art. 45 of the Law on the Bulgarian
National Bank
Croatia 5% of the budget for the current year (to be banned in the new law) Not beyond the end of
the fiscal year
Arts. 57 & 58 of the Law on the
Croatian National Bank (amended
version 1994)
Czech Republic No direct lending to the Republic or its bodies, regional authorities, bodies
governed by public law or legal entities under the control of the state, a regional
authority or a body governed by public law ( with the exception of banks) not
even through the purchase of bonds from such entities (unless in order to
regulate the money market).
Arts. 30 (2) & 32 of the Act on the
Czech National Bank
Estonia No direct or indirect granting of credits to the government, no purchases of
government securities.
Law on the Central Bank of the
Republic of Estonia
Hungary 2% of the planned budget revenue of the actual year. 15 days in a calendar
month
Art. 18 (4) of the Act LX of 1991 on
the National Bank of Hungary (last
amended 1997)
Latvia No credits to the state or to state institutions and no purchases of government
bonds on the primary market.
Art. 36 of the Law on the Bank of
Latvia30
Lithuania No credits to the state or to state institutions and no purchases of government
bonds on the primary market.
Art. 37 of the Law on the Bank of
Lithuania
Macedonia 5% of the current budget, but exceptions allowed if the Republic has debt due to
regulations of external debt or membership in international organisations.
Usually not beyond the
end of the fiscal year
Art 46 of the National Bank of the
Republic of Macedonia Act
Poland No direct lending to the government. Art. 220.2 of the Constitution
Romania 7% of the State budget revenues of the previous year. 180 days Art 29(4) The National Bank of
Romania Act
Russia No credits to the state or to state institutions and no purchases of government
bonds on the primary market unless foreseen by the federal law for the federal
budget.
Art. 22 of the Federal Law of the
Bank of Russia
Slovak Republic Only payments from credit balances of the accounts of state entities, but credits
to the Deposit Protection Fund are possible.
Arts. 25 and 24 (3) of the National
Bank of Slovakia Act
Slovenia 5% of the budget of the Republic of the current year and 1/5 of the total
anticipated budget deficit.
Not beyond the end of
the fiscal year
Law of the Bank of Slovenia, Art.
61
Turkey No credits to the state or to state institutions and no purchases of government
bonds on the primary market.
Art. 56 of the Law on the Central
Bank of the Republic of Turkey
(amended 25.4.01)
Ukraine No direct lending to finance expenses of the state budget. Art. 54 of the Law of Ukraine on the
National Bank of Ukraine
Yugoslavia 10% of the planned yearly budget. Short term Art. 34 of the Federal Law on the
National Bank of Yugoslavia
(Version: 1999)
Source: Based on central bank laws and on Hochreiter and Kowalski (2000).SEIGNIORAGE
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Table A3. Seigniorage by concepts in the Czech Republic  (in million € or as stated
otherwise)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 740 793 942 893 401 309
(as a % of GDP) 1.95 1.73 2.13 1.73 0.79 0.58
Implied EMU 314 122 109 136 131 226
(as a % of GDP) 0.83 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.43
Fiscal concept 91 -557 975 -1.132 956 120
(as a % of GDP) 0.24 -1.22 2.21 -2.20 1.88 0.23
Of which:
Net interest revenues 135 258 226 254 213 120
(as a % of GDP) 0.36 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.23
Sterilisation costs 285 493 216 437 195 27
(as a % of GDP) 0.75 1.08 0.49 0.85 0.38 0.05
Valuation gains 241 -322 965 -949 938 27
(as a % of GDP) 0.63 -0.70 2.19 -1.84 1.84 0.05
Base money to GDP
in %
18.38 13.8 14.2 12.4 11.7 11.0
Inflation (CPI) in % 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9
Source: Financial statements of the Czech National Bank, statistical office.
Table A4. Seigniorage by concepts in Estonia (in million € or as stated otherwise)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 15.17 12.12 30.55 61.49 26.38 30.82
(in % of GDP) 0.58 0.36 0.74 1.31 0.55 0.57
Implied EMU 10.9 9.66 11.03 12.13 10.83 18.91
(in % of GDP) 0.42 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.35
Fiscal concept 13.09 11.39 14.68 18.82 14.29 20.07
(in % of GDP) 0.50 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.30 0.37
Of which:
Net interest revenues 13.11 11.4 14.68 18.83 14.29 20.07
(in % of GDP) 0.50 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.30 0.37
Sterilisation costs 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
(in % of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Base money to GDP
in %
9.32 10.27 10.79 11.41 12.24 12.97
Inflation (CPI) in % 28.9 23.1 11.1 8.2 3.3 4
Source: Financial statements of the National Bank of Hungary, statistical office.FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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Table A5. Seigniorage by concepts in Hungary (in million € or as stated otherwise)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 829 920 855 760 737 572
(in % of GDP) 2.16 2.77 2.22 1.93 1.65 1.25
Implied EMU 91 79 86 91 131 138
(in % of GDP) 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.30
Fiscal concept 882 288 82 465 88 262
(in % of GDP) 2.29 0.87 0.21 1.18 0.20 0.57
Of which:
Net interest revenues 1 -40 -39 -0 23 76
(in % of GDP) 0.00 -0.12 -0.10 0.00 0.05 0.17
Sterilisation costs 15 225 345 369 221 97
(in % of GDP) 0.04 0.68 0.90 0.94 0.49 0.21
Valuation gains 896 553 466 834 286 283
(in % of GDP) 2.33 1.67 1.21 2.12 0.64 0.62
Base money to GDP in % 7.8 16.4 10.4 10.2 10.5 10.9
Inflation (CPI) in % 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8
Source: Financial statements of the National Bank of Hungary, statistical office.
Table A6. Seigniorage by concepts in Poland (in million € or as stated otherwise)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 2.252 2.215 2.824 2.433 1.667 2266
(in % of GDP) 2.48 2.08 2.31 1.81 1.22 1.27
Implied EMU 252 227 228 277 264 401
(in % of GDP) 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.23
Fiscal concept 123 270 -765 -22 1.667 -1.291
(in % of GDP) 0.14 0.25 -0.63 -0.02 1.13 -0.73
Of which:
Net interest revenues 375 376 430 525 485 635.5
(in % of GDP) 0.41 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.33 0.35
Sterilisation costs 260 205 1.359 1.231 614 1089.3
(in % of GDP) 0.29 0.19 1.11 0.92 0.42 0.61
Valuation gains 9 98 163 684 1.795 -836.7
(in % of GDP) 0.01 0.09 0.13 0.51 1.22 -0.47
Base money to GDP in % 9.3 8.2 8.5 9.0 8.9 7.1
Inflation (CPI) in % 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 9.0
Source: Financial statements of the National Bank of Poland, statistical office.SEIGNIORAGE
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Table A7. Seigniorage by concepts in Slovenia (in million € or as stated otherwise)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 62 65 79 98 95 112
(in % of GDP) 0.45 0.47 0.57 0.71 0.69 0.81
Implied EMU 15 12 12 17 17 26
(in % of GDP) 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.14
Fiscal concept 31 79 77 2 144 149
(in % of GDP) 0.22 0.55 0.50 0.01 0.78 0.78
Of which:
Net interest revenues 25 22 23 31 32 44
(in % of GDP) 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.23
Sterilisation costs 4 6 34 16 13 7
(in % of GDP) 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.09 0.07 0.04
Valuation gains 10 63 88 -13 125 113
(in % of GDP) 0.07 0.44 0.57 -0.07 0.68 0.59
Base money to GDP in
%
4.2 5.0 6.0 7.5 9.0 9.7
Inflation (CPI) in % 13.5 9.9 8.4 7.9 6.1 8.9
Source: financial statements of the National Bank of Hungary, statistical office.34
Table A8. Chosen variables and assumptions for the calculation of seigniorage
Sterilisation instruments Interest rate on sterilisation
instruments and as rate of
opportunity cost
Assumed structure of foreign assets Exchange rate regime
Czech National Bank (CNB) Other liabilities to
domestic banks
Repo rate (2 weeks)* 35% USD, 65% DEM/EUR Until 26 May 1998: basket peg
35% USD, 65% DEM
Since 27 May 1998: managed float





bills held by resident
credit institutions
Base rate Until end of 1999: 30% USD, 70%
DEM/EUR
Since 2000: 100% EUR
Crawling peg regime to basket
Until end of 1996: 30% USD, 70%
ECU. Until end of 1999: 30% USD,
70% DEM. Since 2000: 100% EUR
National Bank of Poland
(NBP)
Liabilities to banks from
open market operations
and others, securities
issued by the NBP
Basic refinancing rate Until end of 1998: 45% USD, 35%
DEM, 10% GBP, 5% FF, 5% SF
Since 1999: 45 USD, 55% EUR
Crawling band regime to basket
Until end of 1998: 45% USD, 35%
DEM, 10% GBP, 5% FF, 5% SF,
Until 11 April 2000: 45% USD, 55%
EUR
Since 12 April 2000: full floating
Bank of Slovenia Tolar and foreign
exchange bills
Bill rates on sterilisation
instrument, average between
lombard and discount rate as
rate of opportunity cost
1995: 64% EUR/36% USD
1996-97: 70% EUR/30% USD
1998: 68% EUR/32% USD
1999: 69% EUR/31% USD
2000: 74% EUR/26% USD
Managed float
Eesti Bank Securities (CDs) Overnight lending rate 100% DEM/EUR Currency board to DEM/EUR
* (Discount + lombard rate)/2 in 1995 (Jan-Nov), Pribor 2 weeks in 2000.SEIGNIORAGE
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Balance sheets of central banks (calculated from monthly averages)
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Evolution of base money, foreign assets and claims to banks
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Base money Foreign assets Claims to banksFRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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Foreign assets Base money Claims on banks
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ANNEX II. INFERRED CONCEPTS OF SEIGNIORAGE FROM BUDGET IDENTITIES
In the following analysis it will be shown that concepts of seigniorage can be inferred
from different presentations of the government’s budget constraint.
27 The theoretical
concepts, the monetary and the opportunity cost concept, thereby will match a fiscal
concept, if special processes for the creation of base money are considered. For this
purpose, it is assumed that no costs and valuation changes occur and that the central
bank distributes total net revenues from the monopoly in base money to the fiscal
authorities.
Creation of base money by purchases of government bonds
First, assume that the central bank issues base money by purchasing outstanding
government bonds. Thus the fiscal concept is given by  cb
t t
f
t b i s 1 1 - - =  and equals the
opportunity cost concept  1 1 - - = t t
o
t h i s , because base money in this case is covered with
government bonds.
The identity for the fiscal branch of a government is
A.1
F
t t t t t t t S B B T B i G + - + = + - - - 1 1 1
where upper case letters are nominal variables. Government expenditures,  t G , and
interest expenditures on total outstanding bonds,  1 1 - - ￿ t t B i , are financed with tax
revenues  t T , changes in bonds,  1 - - t t B B , and seigniorage received from the central
bank,  F
t S .
Total bonds of the government,  t B , comprise bonds held by the public,  P
t B , or at the
central bank,  CB
t B .
The budget identity of the central bank is








t H H B i S B B




t B B - -  and
seigniorage distributed to the fiscal branch of the government equal interest revenues on
these government bonds and changes in the own liabilities of the central bank, i.e.
changes in base money  ) ( 1 - - t t H H .
Combining the budget identities of the fiscal branch and the central bank produces the
budget identity of the consolidated public sector:






t t t H H B B T B i G
The funds available to the consolidated government sector originate from three sources:
taxes, newly issued bonds held by the public and newly issued base money as
noninterest-bearing debt. Accordingly, from the perspective of the consolidated
                                                
27 See Walsh (1998; pp. 132-147).SEIGNIORAGE
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government sector, the last two terms on the right hand side of the equation comprise
total new debt issued by the government, but only debt held by the public and thus
outside the government sector represents an interest-bearing liability.
Dividing A.3 by the price level,  t P , it can be represented in real terms (indicated by
lower case letters)








t t t P
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The third term on the right hand side,  p
t t
e
t t t b r 1 1 ) 1 /( ) ( ) 1 ( - - ￿ + - ￿ + p p p , represents
reductions of the real value of the government’s outstanding interest-bearing nominal
debt when inflation is unanticipated and thus has not been correctly priced into nominal
interest rates. Reductions of debt denominated in domestic currency due to
unanticipated inflation
29 should not be confused with the inflation tax, which arises as
part of seigniorage as shown in A6. Here changes in base money are rearranged into:











t t t t
t






The first term on the right hand side of A.6 gives the change in real base money
holdings leaving velocity constant. The second term is normally regarded as the
inflation tax. Assuming, that the growth of base money is either driven by real growth
(population and economic growth) or by inflation, these revenues will arise, even if the
economy is stationary. However, the interpretation seems to imply that the government
then receives no revenue if inflation is zero. The inference neglects the real interest
savings to the government of issuing base money as opposed to bonds. For a given level
                                                
28 Bonds of the previous period are presented as  t t t t t t t t b P P P B P B p + ￿ = ￿ = - - - - - 1 / 1 / / / 1 1 1 1 1  and
then rearranged.
29 Or equivalently, unanticipated depreciation when measuring variables in a foreign currency.FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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of total liabilities of the government, interest costs will decrease, if base money takes up
an increasing share of total liabilities. A shift from interest-bearing debt (bonds held by
the public, i.e. outside the central bank) to noninterest-bearing debt (base money) would
allow the government to reduce total tax revenues or increase government expenditures
or both. Using equation A.5 and A.6 and assuming that inflation is fully anticipated,
gives
A.7 1 1 1 1 1 1
- - - - - ￿
+













Adding  1 1 - - ￿ t t h r  to both sides of the equation gives the government’s budget
constraint expressed in terms of total liabilities of the government.
A.8 1
1
1 1 1 1
-
-
- - - ￿
+
+ - + = ￿ + t
t
t
t t t t t t h
i
d d d r g
p
t
where  d resembles total liabilities of the government, i.e. bonds held outside the
government sector and base money. In this case  d  actually equals total outstanding
bonds,  b, because base money is backed with government bonds held at the central
bank. The opportunity cost on base money depends directly on the nominal rate of








 and the rate of return, the
government would have to offer as an opportunity cost if it were not able to issue base
money  ( ) 1 t r - .
Creation of base money by purchases of assets outside the government sector
If the central bank issues base money exclusively by purchasing assets outside the
government sector  ( ) A , the result of the analysis will not change to the first case, where
the central bank purchases outstanding government bonds, but the reasoning is different.
The fiscal concept is given by  1 1 - - = t t
f
t a i s  and equals the opportunity cost concept
1 1 - - = t t
o
t h i s , because base money now is covered with assets.
The budget identity of the central bank, A.2, becomes
A.9 ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 - - - - - + ￿ = + - t t t t
F
t t t H H A i S A A
And the consolidated government-sector budget identity, A.3, is now
A.10 ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 - - - - - + - + = + t t t t t t t t H H B B T B i G
because total bonds are held outside the government sector. Expressed in real variables,
assuming again fully anticipated inflation and adding  1 1 - - ￿ t t h r  to both sides yields
A.8.
The central bank now receives assets and thereby the government accumulates wealth.
In contrast, issuing base money by purchasing government bonds has just shifted
already existing interest-bearing debt to noninterest-bearing debt. Arguing with theSEIGNIORAGE
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opportunity cost is easier in case of purchasing outstanding government bonds, which
have financed budget deficits. In case net assets are purchased the opportunity cost
argument will hold, if the purchase of assets is compulsory for the government. For
example the government must build up foreign exchange reserves, which it otherwise
had financed with interest-bearing debt.
Creation of base money by direct lending to the government
Seigniorage measured by the monetary concept ignores any interest savings due to the
privilege of the government to issue base money as noninterest-bearing debt. If it
matches the fiscal concept, it reflects the financing of current government deficits by
receiving non-interest bearing advances from the central bank. Advances to the fiscal
authorities for current expenditures are measured in each period by  t
f
t c s = , which
directly translates into changes in base money and thus into the monetary concept.
The budget identity of the fiscal branch of the government, A.1, reduces to
A.11 F
t t t S T G + =
and the government’s budget constraint expressed in terms of total liabilities of the
government, A.8, becomes
A.12 1 - ￿ + = t t t t h g q t
However, fiscally exploiting the monopoly in base money is usually more complicated
in practice. For example, if the government finances its deficits by newly issued bonds
and if the central bank purchases these government bonds during the same period, in
which the deficit occured, interest revenues and expenditures are netted out in the
budget identity of the consolidated government and the real value of changes in base
money reflect the additional revenues, the government receives from its monopoly in
base money. A precondition is, that the issuance of government bonds solely finances
government deficits. This will become clear in the next section.
Wealth or net indebtedness of the public sector?
The creation of base money at the central bank either leads to the accumulation of
claims to the government or to other sectors. On a consolidated basis claims to the
government held against base money are part of the indebtedness of the public sector.
The following analysis elaborates this difference more explicitly because the distinction
can become important for a government, which considers the unilateral adoption of a
foreign currency.
30
Assuming infinite periods over which an intertemporal balanced budget is required, the
government’s wealth constraint is given by
A.13 W + = + w b h
p
Total assets of the government are given by  w, whereas  W comprises net government
indebtedness arising by virtue of the monopoly in base money. Both will be either
financed with base money,  h, or with bonds held outside the government sector.
                                                
30 For a similar analysis on the effects of seigniorage on government’s wealth, see Drazen (1984).FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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Assuming, that assets and outstanding bonds bear the same rate of return, A.13 can be
written as
A.14 W + = a h
where  p b w a - = . These net assets also arise by virtue of the monopoly in base money.
For example, a central bank purchases foreign assets in exchange of base money by its
privilege to issue noninterest-bearing paper money. In contrast, if a government
finances budget deficits by directly borrowing from the central bank, it will increase its
indebtedness W.
Issuing base money by purchasing government bonds can either result in net assets or in
net government indebtedness backing base money. To underline the argument, assume
two extreme cases. In the first case the central bank purchases government bonds, but a
balanced budget is always required. Bonds can only be issued to finance new assets,
thus any retirement of outstanding bonds increases net assets. And as the issuance of
base money induces an equivalent retirement of interest bearing debt, base money is
always backed by net assets and grows each period by  1 - ￿ t t a q . The wealth constraint
reduces to  w b h
p = +  or  a h = .
If only an intertemporal budget balance is required, the issuance of new bonds can also
finance budget deficits over some periods and then be retired over other periods. In this
case a retirement of bonds does not necessarily increase net assets backing base money.
To stress the other extreme assume the second case, in which the issuance of bonds only
finance budget deficits by base money and not the purchase of assets. A central bank
which purchases bonds when issuing base money then shifts a financing of budget
deficits by bonds to a financing by base money. Whereas the financing of deficits by
bonds is only possible temporarily, because an intertemporal balanced budget is
required, the financing of deficits by base money is permanent, because base money is
considered as a nonrepayable liability. The government wealth constraint becomes
W = h . Base money is now backed by net government indebtedness, which
resembles the sum of all budget deficits financed by base money. In principle, the two
cases can be sharply divided, but in practice it will be hard to assess whether the
purchase of a particular bond increases net assets or net government indebtedness.
The creation of base money, which is backed by net government indebtedness,
facilitates the analysis, whether purchases of government bonds by the central bank
have inflationary consequences.
Inflationary consequences from the creation of base money
Direct borrowing from the central bank in order to finance current deficits enables extra
demand from the government. It will cause inflation if extra demand followed by a
subsequent creation of money takes place at a rate that exceeds demand at the current
price level. This mechanism is straightforward, however, deriving at inflationary
consequences from the creation of base money by purchasing government bonds is less
simple.
In order to show under which conditions purchases of government bonds at the central
bank bear inflationary consequences, it is assumed that issuing base money by
purchasing government bonds increases net indebtedness rather than net assets. EvenSEIGNIORAGE
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under this precondition purchases of bonds may only lead to inflationary financing as
one of several choices. Assume the budget equation of the consolidated government
sector for each period is given by
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+ ￿ . The government’s expenditure and tax plans are said
to satisfy the requirement of intertemporal budget balance (the “no Ponzi condition”) if












Accordingly, equation A.16 can be rewritten as
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The right side of A.17 becomes the present discounted value of all current and future
government expenditures and tax and seigniorage revenues. It equals current
outstanding debt, 
p
t b 1 - , which has financed past deficits. The government must plan to
raise sufficient revenues or reduce its expenditures, in present-value terms, to repay its
existing debt, if the intertemporal budget balance holds over infinite periods.
In this analytical framework purchasing government bonds, which have financed past
budget deficits or which finance current deficits, bear the same inflationary
consequences. In the first case the stock of outstanding government bonds of the
previous period has been reduced and seigniorage has financed past budget deficits and
not current government expenditures, which are instead financed by newly issued bonds
of the current period. In the second case outstanding government bonds of the previous
period remain unchanged and seigniorage finances current expenditures. So in both
cases, the stock of outstanding bonds in the current period remains constant and the
current deficit has been financed by newly issued bonds, which have been either bought
by the central bank or by the private sector. The intertemporal budget balance will hold
if the government revises its plans and it has basically three choices. Either it reduces
government expenditures or it increases taxes or it finances the deficit with seigniorage.
The last alternative will lead to higher inflation in this framework, if the growth in base
money is not sustained by real growth and if the velocity of base money either stays
constant or even increases. Eventually it is hard to foresee inflationary consequences of
                                                
31 See e.g. Walsh (1998, p. 138).FRANZISKA SCHOBERT
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purchasing government bonds at the central bank, because an exploitation of the
inflation tax just remains one of several choices.
In practice, some statutes of central banks prohibit purchases of government bonds as
well as direct lending to the government. Other central bank laws are less strict and only
prohibit purchases of government bonds at the primary market whereas they allow
purchases of bonds at the secondary market, if the transaction is used to achieve the
objectives of the central bank and to carry out its tasks.
32 Purchases of government
bonds at the primary market can have an additional effect on the cost of credit of the
government, if the extra demand of the central bank reduces the yield on the bond. If the
reduced cost of credit then leads to a higher demand for borrowing of the government, it
can add to inflationary impulses.
Financing the unilateral adoption of a foreign currency
Now the analysis turns to the question how the official substitution of base money by a
foreign currency is financed. As will be shown it will be principally irrelevant whether
the country needs to take up a loan to finance the purchase of cash in foreign currency
or whether it can use marketable assets which have backed base money.
In order to show this result losses on seigniorage are analysed for an economy in which
base money is generated either by creating net assets (case I) or by lending to the
government (case II). Case I may be an example of a central bank, which is financially
independent and only acquires assets outside the government sector when issuing base
money. In contrast case II gives an example of a central bank, which may serve the
fiscal needs of the government by issuing base money and receiving claims to the
government. The most important difference for the following analysis arises in case of
an unilateral adoption of a foreign currency. If the economy in case I euroises or
dollarises it will have a sufficient backing of base money by marketable assets, whereas
the economy in case II would need to take up a loan to acquire cash in foreign currency,
which substitutes for cash in domestic currency.
Let  t p , rt and  t n denote the inflation rate, the real interest rate and the domestic real
growth rate in period t. For simplicity, they are assumed to be constant over time and
equal, respectively, to r, p and n. And assume that the income elasticity of the demand
for real balances and the elasticity of nominal balances with regards to the price level
are unity and velocity changes do not exist. Real balances accordingly grow at the rate
n and nominal balances at the rate  nn pp ++ , which equals  q under these
assumptions. For analytical purposes base money and cash in circulation are identical
and costs and valuation changes do not occur with the creation of base money.
Case I. Base money is fully backed by net assets
Assume, the central bank issues base money by receiving assets in exchange, for
example it creates base money by interventions in the foreign exchange market.
Seigniorage in each period consists of the interest revenues on the net assets held as
counterparts of base money.
                                                
32 See for example Article 18 of the statute of the European System of Central Banks or selected central
bank laws of Central and Eastern European countries given in the Annex.SEIGNIORAGE
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Defining  1(1)(1) n qp +=+￿+ , the nominal value of net assets in period t is equal to
0 (1)
ntn
t AA q =+￿  and the present discounted value of seigniorage, PDVS
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In order to arrive at a steady state value, r>n is postulated as a standard condition in
dynamic optimisation, so i>q.
Case II: The counterpart of base money is net government indebtedness
Now the central bank issues base money to cover budget deficits. Seigniorage is
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If the country unilaterally euroises the loss of foregone seigniorage is measured by
PDVS
I in case I and by PDVS
II in case II. But the economy in case II additionally needs






” r be the ratio of the loss of seigniorage in case I and in case II, r is





Because  i q >  according to the standard condition the country in case I will always
















The difference between losses in case I and in case II equals the nominal value of base
money at the time, at which the economy introduced a foreign currency. It is the value
of the loan, which the economy in case II needs to take up to finance cash in foreign
currency. The loan actually finances past deficits, which have been financed with base
money so far. So in contrast to corporate finance the loan finances past debt and no new
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investment. Accordingly, the government services past budget deficits, which it would
otherwise not redeem, if it held on to its monopoly in base money.
The present value of the loan can be simply derived by assuming non-repayable debt of
the value L=H0 with infinite constant interest payments. The present discounted value of




PDVB L ￿ =
where  L i is the interest rate paid on the loan and i  is the discount rate.
34 Assuming that
the interest rate on the loan and the discount rate are equal, the present value of
borrowing is equal to the initial value of base money, H 0. Under these assumption the
governments in case I and II bear the same costs when they adopt a foreign currency.
The result holds for infinite periods and neglects any cash constraints, governments may
face during some periods. Especially EU-accession countries
35 only temporarily face
losses of seigniorage until they join the monetary union and so it will be analysed
whether this fact will change the result.
Central banks of case I, which have backed base money by marketable assets, can
readily convert cash in domestic currency to cash in foreign currency. They will lose
seigniorage arising from the interest income on these assets until they join the monetary
union and participate on the sharing of seigniorage without contributing to the common
pool of seigniorage, because they do not hold the assets backing base money any more.
The saved contribution to the common pool per period will be  0 iA ￿  and its net present
value over sufficiently long periods
36 will be the value of the assets, which have been
used to purchase cash in foreign currency. So eventually, the government will only use
the foregone interest income on these assets until it joins the monetary union.
A government as in case II, which has no marketable assets to back base money, bears
losses on foregone monetary seigniorage plus the debt-service of the loan until it joins
the monetary union. Then it will participate on the sharing of seigniorage without
contributing to the common pool. Its saved contribution will be equal to  0 iH ￿ , its stock
of base money at the time it introduced a foreign currency times a reference rate. This is
the so called indirect method to calculate the contribution of seigniorage. According to
the statute of the ESCB, seigniorage should be calculated by applying the direct method,
which is based on the return of assets backing base money. But a central bank as
described by case II would not have any interest-bearing assets and therefore it is
assumed, that it would have to apply the indirect method to assess its contribution of
seigniorage to the common pool. If the reference rate equals the interest rate paid on the
loan, the government would not bear any debt-service costs any more after it joins the
                                                
34 The relevant discount rate is the rate at which seigniorage is earned each period. It presents the
opportunity cost on the loan, because seigniorage would be earned if no loan is taken up to substitute cash
in domestic currency for cash in foreign currency.
35 Or even non EU-accession countries, which will join the accession process later.
36 Again assuming equal interest and discount rates.SEIGNIORAGE
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monetary union and therefore it will only lose seigniorage and pay the debt-service on
the loan until it joins the monetary union.
Finally, more general qualifications to the theoretical analysis have to be kept in mind.
The analysis is based on the steady state assumption, in which interest rates are equal
and growth rates and inflation are constant over time and in which the steady state
condition  n r >  always holds. Especially for shorter time horizons economic
developments might significantly deviate from steady state conditions. Time horizons of
just a couple of years are relevant for many EU-accession countries and maybe even for
non EU-accession countries, which attempt to join the group of accession countries. For
them, any measurement of seigniorage based on infinite horizons and on steady state
assumptions may be misleading, as velocity changes to base money may lead to very
different results than those derived from steady state conditions.
And a country may not need to take up a loan, which covers total domestic cash by
foreign cash at the exchange rate chosen for conversion. Rather than unilaterally
introducing a foreign currency the government can legalise the foreign currency and
thereby introduce a parallel currency system with a flexible exchange rate. The
government can drive out the domestic currency gradually by making its payments to
the private sector in foreign currency. The initial amount of cash in foreign currency is
then not the amount, which totally substitutes domestic cash, but the amount which
enables the government to fulfil its payment obligations in cash. The government would
reduce its costs, if the value of domestic cash measured in foreign currency reduces
during this process. However, this crucially depends on a depreciation of the domestic
currency, which will not necessarily be the case.